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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL FARM J\IORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
vs. 
VANCE D. WALKER as Adminis-
trator of the estate of Gearld C. A } ' 
Walker, deceased; LEONA W.\ ppe lant S 
CORBITT; ELVEN WALKER; I • 
LUELLA w. RosKELLEY; MAX Brief. 
WALKER; HARRY WALKER, by 
his guardian ad litem Vance D. Case No. 7211 
Walker, FIRST DOE; SECOND 
DOE; T HI R D D 0 E; and 
FOURTH DOE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the Honor-
able ~1arriner M. Morrison, judge of the District Court of 
the First Judicial District in and for Cache County, State 
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of Utah, whereby and wherein on the 6th day of April, 
1948, he entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants. ( R. 65-66. ) 
The plaintiff filed an action on the 19th day of Sep-
tember, 1946, in which it prayed to foreclose a judgment 
lien made and entered on the 28th day of September, 
1938, against the property of one, Gerald C. Walker, de-
ceased, the judgment debtor. To the complaint, the de-
fendants interposed a general demurrer. Prior to the 
Court's ruling on the demurrer, Harry Walker, by his 
guardian ad litem, pursuant to an order of the District 
Court, filed an answer and cross complaint. To these the 
plaintiff interposed a general demurrer. The plaintiff's 
complaint was subsequently amended by a separate instru-
ment and defendant, Harry Walker's answer and cross 
complaint, were also amended. The trial Court overruled 
the defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and sus-
tained the plaintiff's demurrer to defendant, Harry Walk-
er's amended answer and cross complaint on the lOth 
day of January, 1948. The defendants elected to stand 
on their pleadings, and failed to further plead; their de-
fault was entered and from the judgment of the Court the 
defendants appeal as above mentioned. (R.0-23.72.) 
PLEADINGS 
That part of the complaint pertinent to the discussions 
is as follows: 
That one, Gerald C. Walker, died about the 14th day 
of January, 1946, at El Segundo, California. That the 
defendant, Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed and 
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qualified administrator of his estate. That the other de-
fendants named, except the Doe's, were the children of 
the decedent and his sole surviving heirs at law. That 
at the date of the decedent's death and since the 7th day 
of September, 198.3, or prior thereto, the said decedent 
was the 0\Yner in fee of record of certain real property 
situated in Cache Count:·, Utah, which it then described. 
That on or about the 27th day of September, 1938, 
the plaintiff, in foreclosure proceedings wherein the said 
decedent was one of the defendants, recovered a judg-
ment against him in the sum of $3,384.07. That the pro-
perty covered by the mortgage was sold by the Sheriff 
at public sale pursuant to the order of the Court, for the 
sum of $1823.13. That this amount was credited to the 
judgment, leaving a deficiency balance in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the decedent in the sum of $1614.77. 
That the said sum of $1614.77 nor the interest thereon has 
not been paid. That the judgment against the said Ger-
ald C. Walker was duly made and entered on the 27th 
day of September, 1938, and that it then and there became 
and ever since has been and now is a judgment lien against 
the real property described in the complaint. The plain-
tiff prayed that the judgment be declared a lien upon the 
real estate described in its complaint, that it be sold to 
satisfy the judgment and the proceeds applied in the pay-
ment of the amount due the plaintiff on its judgment, and 
that any surplus be paid to the person or persons entitled 
thereto, and that the defendants be foreclosed of any in-
terest they had in the premises. ( R.0-3) On the 8th day 
of April, 1947, the plaintiff amended its complaint by a 
separate instrument, setting forth therein that it waived 
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Iecourse against any and all property, both real and per-
sonal, of the estate of said decedent, except that which it 
described in paragraphs 2 of its complaint. ( R.9.) 
DEMURRER 
The defendants on the 9th day of October, 1946, filed 
a general demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, setting forth 
that it did not state sufficient facts to state a cause of 
action. ( R.4. ) 
AMENDED ANSWER 
The defendant, Harry Walker, by his guardian ad 
litem, Vance D. Walker, pursuant to an order of the Dis-
trict Court, filed an answer and cross complaint, the perti-
nent parts of which are as follows: 
That the defendant, Harry Walker, was a minor of 
the age of twenty years and a resident of Smithfield, Utah, 
that Vance D. Walker was his duly appointed and quali-
fied guardian ad litem; admitted all the material allega-
tions of said complaint, except that he denied that the 
judgment made and entered on the 27th day of September, 
1938, had ever been and that it now is a judgment lien 
upon and against the property described in plaintiff's com-
plaint. He futrher alleged that at the time of the death 
of Gerald C. Walker, that he was a resident of Smithfield, 
Cache County, Utah, the head of a family, that the pro-
perty sought to be foreclosed by the plaintiff was the only 
real estate owned by the decedent at all times mentioned 
in plaintiff's complaint, and that it was the decedent's 
homestead, and that the said deficiency; judgment never 
attached as a lien to said property. 
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By way of a separate and further answer, the defend-
ant alleged: 
That on or about the lOth day of August, 1946, one 
Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed administrator 
of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, and was the 
duly qualified and acting administrator of said estate. 
That on or about the 17th day of December, 1946, the ad-
ministrator filed an inventory and appraisement including 
all the property of the said Gerald C. Walker, deceased, 
which consisted of the property described in plaintiff's 
complaint, together with one share of water stock. That 
the property was duly appraised and the value set forth 
in the inventory a!!d appraisement was of the sum of 
$1,050.00. That the decedent's wife had predeceased him. 
That the defendant, Harry Walker, was a minor of nine-
teen years of age at the date of distribution hereinafter 
mentioned, and the only minor child of the decedent. That 
on the 28 day of December, 1946, all of the property of 
the decedent, Gerald C. Walker, deceased, was distributed 
to him by; a decree of summary distribution pursuant to 
102-8-2, U.C.A. 1943. That he was a resident of Smith-
field Utah, at all times mentioned in plaintiff's complaint, 
and that the property was of the value of $1,050.00 and 
vested in him as his homestead. 
By way of a second separate and further answer, the 
defendant alleged: 
That if said judgment was ever a lien that it ceased 
to be one as it expired on the 28th day of September, 1946. 
By way of a third separate and further answer, the 
defendant alleged, the material part of this discussion 
being: 
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That the judgment mentioned in plaintiff's com-
plaint was a money judgment and that it has never been 
presented for payment to the administrator of the estate 
of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, as required by 102-9-16, 
U.C.A., 1943. 
A~1ENDED CROSS COlVIPLAINT 
The defendant, Harry Walker, by his guardian ad 
litem, in his cross complaint set forth tha! the plaintiff 
was a corporation, the defendant's infancy, the appoint-
ment of the guardian ad litem, and that one Gerald C. 
\Valker, deceased, died on the 14th day of January, 1946, 
at which time he was a resident of Smithfield, Utah. That 
one, Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed, qualified 
and acting administrator of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, 
deceased, having been appointed on the lOth day of 
August, 1946. That the decedent at the time of his death 
was the owner of certain property situated in Cache 
County, State of Utah, describing the property, and setting 
forth the names of the heirs at law of the decedent, their 
ages, and further stating that the defendant at the time 
of the decedent's death was nineteen years of age. That 
Gerald C. Walker, deceased, at his death, was a widower 
and unmarried, and that the defendant, Harry Walker, 
was his only minor child. That the property described 
in the complaint was inventoried and appraised and the 
inventory and appraisement filed in the District Court, 
the value of which was the sum of $1050.00. That pur-
suant to the inventory and appraisement and the petition 
of the administrator, the property was distributed by a 
decree entered on the 28th day of December, 1946, to 
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the defendant by the way of summary distribution under 
102-8-1 and 2, U.C.A., 1943. That since said date, de-
fendant has been and now is the owner in fee, and that 
said property vested in him as a homestead. That on the 
28th day of September, 1938, a money judgment, wherein 
the plaintiff was the judgment creditor, and the said 
Gerald C. Walker was the judgment debtor in the sum 
of $1614.77 was duly docketed in the office of the County 
Clerk of Cache County, State of Utah in the book of judg-
ments at page 269, and the same remains unsatisfied of 
record and constitutes a cloud upon the defendant's title~ 
That the property described in the cross complaint was 
the only real estate owned by the deceased, Gerald C. 
Walker, at the time of his death, that he was the head of 
a family and that the deficiency judgment never attached 
as a lien on said property. He further alleges that if the 
judgment was ever a lien, that the same expired and ceased 
to be one on the 28th day of September, 1938. That the 
plaintiff claimed an interest in the said real estate adverse . 
to the defendant and that it was without any right, title 
or interest whatsoever. The defendant then prayed that 
title to the property be qui ted in him. ( R.21-24. ) 
PLAINTIFF'S DEMURRER 
The plaintiff filed a general demurrer to defandant' s 
answer and cross complaint, setting forth that neither the 
answer or cross complaint stated sufficient facts to consti-
tute a cause of action. ( R.l6. ) Before the demurrer 
was ruled on, the defendant, Harry Walker, by his guard-
ian ad litem, filed an amended answer and cross complaint 
as aforementioned, to which the plaintiff and defendants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
stipulated that plaintiff's demurrer was to be considered 
a demurrer to the amended answer and cross complaint. 
(R.l7.) 
COURT'S RULING 
The Court overruled defendants' demurrer to plain-
tiff's complaint and sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the 
defendant, Harry C. Walker's amended answer and cross 
complaint on the lOth day of January, 1948. The defend-
ants were given ten days after notice in which to further 
plead. Notice was given. The defendants, however, 
elected to stand on their pleadings. ( R.72.) 
The default of the defendants was entered, and the 
Court on the 6th day of April, 1948, made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Foreclasure in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendants. ( R.63-67.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Court erred in making and entering its judg-
ment of foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant ( R.66.) 
2. The Court erred in entering its Findings of Fact 
and conclusions of Law ( R.63-65.) 
3. The Court erred in making and entering para-
graphs 3 and 6 of Findings of Fact. ( R.63.) 
4. The Court erred in making and entering that 
part of paragraph one of its Conclusions of law which 
reads: 
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"and it then and there became, ever since has been 
and now is a judgment lien upon and against the real 
property hereinbefore specifically described." ( R.65.) 
5. The Court erred in 1naking and entering para-
graphs 2 and 3, of its Conclusions of Law. ( R.65.) 
6. The Court erred in overruling defendants' gen-
eral demurrer to plaintiffs complaint. ( R. 72. ) 
7. The Court erred in sustaining plaintiffs general 
demurrer to the defendant, Harry Walker's amended ans-
wer by his guardian at litem. ( R. 72. ) 
8. The Court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's gen-
eral demurrer to defendant, Harry Walker's amended 
cross complaint by his guardian at litem. ( R. 72. ) 
ARGUMENT 
Assignments of Errors 1 and 8 inclusive can be con-
sidered together. The Court erred in overruling the de-
fendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs complaint for the 
reasons that: 
(a) The complaint on its face showed that the plain-
tiff was attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of 
equity to enforce a purported money judgment lien 
against a deceased judgment creditor instead of proceed-
ing in the probate court to effect its collection. Further 
plaintiff failed to allege that its claim had been presented 
to the administrator of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, 
deceased, and that it had been denied. 
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(b) Secondly, plaintiff's judgment lien, if any, ex-
pired and ceased to be a lien on the 28th day fo Septem-
ber, 1946, more than fifteen months prior to the Court's 
overruling the defendant's general demurrer and more 
than eighteen months before the entry of judgment. 
The Court had before it, 101-4-6, U.C.A. 1943, which 
provides: 
"A homestead as provided by section 1, title Home-
steads, together with all personal property exempt 
from execution, shall be wholly exempt from the pay-
ment of the debts of the decedent, and shall be the 
absolute property of the surviving husband or wife 
and minor children, or if the minor children in case 
there is no surviving husband or wife, or the surviving 
husband or wife in case there are no minor children, 
to be set apart on petition and notice, at any time 
after the return of the inventory." 
Also 102-9-4, U.C. 1943, which provides: 
"All claims arising upon contract, whether the same 
are due, not due or contingent, must be presented 
within the time limited in the notice, and any claim 
d . b df 1,'1- 1,'1- !,'!-" not presente 1s arre orever. 
Also 102-9-11, U.C.A. 1943, which provides: 
"No holder of any claim against an estate shall main-
tain any action thereon unless the claim is first pre-
sented to the executor or administrator, except that 
an action may be brought without notice by any 
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holder of a mortgage or lien to enforce the same 
against the property of the estate subject thereto, 
where all recourse against any other property of the 
estate is expressly waived in the complaint; but no 
attorney's fees shall be recovered in such action un-
less such claim is so presented." 
Also 102-9-13, which provides: 
«If any action is pending against the decedent at the 
time of his death, the plaintiff must in like manner 
present his claim to the executor or administrator for 
allowance or rejection, authenticated as required 
in other cases; and no recovery shall be had in the 
action unless proof is made of the presentation re-
quired." 
Also 102-9-16, U.C.A. 1943, which provides: 
«When any judgment has beenn rendered for or 
against the testator or intestate in his lifetime, no 
execution shall issue thereon after his death, except 
as provided in the code of civil procedure relating to 
executions. Judgment against the decedent for the 
recovery of money must be presented to the executor 
or administrator like any other claim. If execution 
is actually levied upon any property of the decedent 
before his death, the same may be sold for the satis-
faction thereof, and the officer making the sale must 
account to the executor or adminstrator for any sur-
plus in his hands. A judgment creditor having a 
judgment which was rendered against the testator 
or intestate in his lifetime may redeem any real estate 
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of the decedent from any sale under foreclosure or 
execution, in the same manner and with the same ef-
fect as if the judgment debtor were still living." 
Also 102-9-22 U. C. A., 1943 which provides: 
::Other debts of the estate must be paid -in the follw-
order: 
( 1 ) The wages of each employee of the decedent 
for services rendered within sixty days next 
preceding his death, not exceeding $100.00. 
( 2) Debts having preference fy the laws of the 
United States or of this State. 
( 3) -All debts which are liens upon the real pro-
perty occupied, selected or set apart as a home-
stead. 
( 4) All other debts which were liens on the pro-
perty of the decedent at the time of his death. 
( 5) All other demands against the estate." 
Also 104-37-7 U. C. A., 1943, which provides: 
"Notwithstanding the death of a party after the judg-
ment, execution thereon may be issued, or it may be 
enforced, as follows: 
( 1) In the 'case of the death of the death of the 
judment creditor, upon the application of his executor 
or administrator, or successor in interest. 
( 2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, 
if the judgment is for the recovery of real or personal 
property or the enforcement of a lien thereon." 
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Also 88-0-1 U. C. A. 1948, which provides: 
"A homestead o o o shall be exempt from judgment 
lien and from execution or forced sale, except upon 
the following obligations: ( 1 ) taxes accruing and 
levied thereon; and ( 2) judgments obtained on debts 
secured by lawful mortgage on the premises and on 
debts created for the purchase price thereof." 
A COURT OF EQUITY IS WITHOUT JURIS-
DICTION TO FORECLOSE A MONEY JUDG-
MENT LIEN AGAINST A DECEASED JUDG-
\IENT CREDITOR. HIS REMEDY IS TO PRO-
CEED IN THE PROBATE COURT FOR ITS COL-
LECTION AFTER ITS PRESENTATION TO AN 
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR AND THEIR 
DENIAL OF IT. 
In determining the question as to whether a court of 
equity has jurisdiction to foreclose a money judgment lien, 
if any, against a deceased judgment creditor, or whether 
the sole jurisdiction in such matters is in the probate court, 
after due presentation of a creditors claim, the foregoing 
statutes should be considered together. 
Although 102-9-11, U.C.A. 1948 provides that "an 
action may be brought without notice by a holder of a 
mortgage or lien," and without presentation of a claim to 
the administrator or executor of an estate, we believe that 
its provision regarding the foreclosure of liens are neces-
sarily limited by the provisions of 102-9-16, U. C. A. 1943, 
which provides "that judgments against a decedent for 
the recovery of money must be presented to the executor 
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or administrator like any other claim." Thus a money 
judgment is excluded from its provisions and a money 
judgment debtor is limited to the probate court for its 
collection. 
Furthermore it seems that the provisions of 102-9-11 
U. C. A. 1943 apply only to those liens which either are 
specifically waived by the judgment debtor or are exempt 
from the provisions of 38-0-1 U. C. A. 1943, our Home-
stead Exemption statute. The only exemption under this 
statute are " ( 1) taxes accruing and levied thereon; and 
( 2) judgments obtained on debts secured by lawful mort-
gage on the premises and on debts created for the pur-
chase price thereof." If this were not true the provisions 
of the probate code which provide for the setting apart of 
a probate homestead for the benefit of a surviving spouse 
and/or minor children as provided for in 104-4-6 U. C. A. 
1943, would be defeated, and again the probate court 
would not be able to discharge the preferences established 
under 102-9-22 U. C. A. 1943, particularly liens upon the 
property set apart as a probate homestead. 
Again, if a lien based on a money judgment can be 
enforced withuot presentation to the executor er admin-
istrator of an estate, its enforcement is not within the jur-
isdiction of a court of equity inasmuch as the judgment 
creditor has an adequate remedy at law, as in such an 
instance :he can proceed by way of execution and sale 
'lnder the provisions of Title 104, Chapter 37, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, for its enforcement. 104-37-7, U. C. A. 
1943, provides an execution can issue and be enforced 
in the case of the death of a judgment debtor "if the judg-
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ment is for the recovery of real or personal property, or 
the enforcement of a lien." Certainly section 102-9-11 was 
not intended by the legislature to give a judgment creditor 
in the event of a judgment debtor's death an additional 
remedy than that already provided by 104-37-7, U. C. A. 
1943, as by its provisions it only purports to set forth in 
what instances and under what circumstances an action 
may be commenced on a mortgage or lien without notice 
or presentation of the claim to the executor or adminis-
trator. 
This court in the case of Fidelity Guaranty Company 
vs. Bletcher, 228 P. 188, 64 Utah 49, held that a 
creditor can not have his claim established in a separate 
and independent action against an administrator but that 
it must have it determined in probate proceedings after 
notice to other claimants. The court said: 
Nor is it affected in its rights to any extent. The 
statute clearly determines the order in which the 
claims that are allowed must be paid. The statute 
having classified the claims, the court can do no more 
than determine the class to which a particularly 
claims belongs, and when that is determined, the 
order of payments follows as a matter of law. The 
plaintiff must therefore assert its alleged preference 
in the probate proceedings and give all the other 
claimants an opportunity to be heard, respecting 
plaintiff's claim. It cannot rush into court and have 
that question determined in a separate and independ-
ent action against the administrator. After notice to 
the several claimants that the plaintiff claims a pre-
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ference and will ask the court to have its claim placed 
into the preferred class, the court will be given op-
portunity to fix a date on which all parties may be 
heard with respect to the matter. Upon such hearing, 
the court may either allow or disallow, either in whole 
or in part, plaintiff's alleged preferential right, and 
thereafter any interested party may appeal to this 
court, as in other cases." 
Our Court again in the case of Wasatch Livestock 
Loan Company vs. Nielsen et. al. 56 P. (2d) 613, said: 
«From the foregoing provisions of the code, it is ap-
parent that a creditor, after the death of his creditor, 
is precluded from securing a specific lien on the pro-
perty of the estate by attachment, execution, or othe! 
legal process unless it be in the course provided by 
the probate code; that is, claims presented and al-
lowed have the same standing whether they be 
founded upon a judgment or claims allowed and ap-
proved by the administrator and the court. In 
either event the claimant must be content to wait 
until the administrator of the estate acquires funds 
with which to pay his claim." (Italics supplied.) 
That a claim based on a money judgment must be 
· presented to the administrator or executor is also the hold-
ing of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In the case of 
Tucker vs. Gautier, 164 P. ( 2d) 613, , the 
Court said: 
"Where the judgment is one for money only and the 
judgment debtor dies the procedure to enforce the 
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judgment is that set forth in 58 0. S. 1941 Sec. 346, 
which reads as follows: 
'\Vhen any judgment has been rendered for or against 
the testator or intestate in his life-time, no execution 
shall issue thereon after his death, except: 
1. In the case of the death of the judgment creditor, 
upon the application of his executor or administrator, 
or successor in interests. 
2. In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the 
judgment be for the recovery of real or personal 
property, or the enforcement of a lien thereon. 
A judgment against the decedent for the recovery of 
money, must be presented to the executor or admin-
istrator, like any other claim. If the execution is 
actually levied upon any property of the decedent be-
fore his death, the same may be sold for the satisfac-
tion thereof, and the officer making the sale must 
account to the executor or administrator for any sur-
plus in his hands.' 
It will be observed from the foregoing quotation that 
it is made the mandatory duty of the judgment credi-
tor who· own a judgment for money only to file a 
claim therefor with the executor or administrator of 
the estate of his deceased judgment debtor. Where 
a judgment creditor does this and the claim is al-
lowed the rights of the judgment creditor under his 
judgment are preserved in every respect and where 
the claim is disallowed he is thereupon relegated to 
the procedure provided in 58.) S. 1941 Sec. 339; and 
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any judgment thus obtained establishes his claim as 
if it had been allowed by the executor and with the 
same result. See 58 0., S. 1941 Sec. 345 and Morton 
v. Adams, 124, Cal. 229, 56 0. 1038, 71 Am. St. Rep. 
53 and In re Wiley's estate, supra." 
Also the Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of 
Cumberland and Liberty Mills, et. al. v. Keggin, 190 So. 
492, said: 
. ' "Section 123. Execution and levies prohibited. No 
executions shall issue upon or be levied under any 
judgment against a decedent or against the personal 
representatives, nor shall any levy be made against 
any property, real or personal, on the estate of a 
decedent. Claims upon all judgments against the 
decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other 
claims against decedent 
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section 
shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of 
mortgages, pledges or ·liens, or claims to specific pro-
perty, real or personal ~ ~ ~' 
Considering the two above quoted sections together, 
it is clear that such enactments forbid executions to 
be issued upon or levied under any judgment against 
a decedent, and forbids any levy; to be made against 
any property of the estate of the decedent; and com-
mands that claims upon all judgments against the 
decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other 
claims against estate of decedents. The proviso to 
section 23 of chapter 16103, added by; Section 8 of 
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chapter 17171, includes pledges or liens, but in view 
of the proceeding provisions, such proviso does not 
include liens of judgment obtained as in this case 
against the decedent in his life time." 
Also see Grace Y. Lee, 57 S.W. (2d) 1095; First 
Kational Bank of Bowie vs. Cone, et. al, 170 S.W. 
- ( 2d) 782; Gulpine vs. Bower et al. 12 So. ( 2d.) 884. 
THE PLAI~'fiFF FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT 
HIS CLAL\1 HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE 
AD:\IINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT'S ES-
TATE A~D DENIED. 
That is a necessary allegation would appear from the 
provisions of 102-9-11, U. C. A., 1943, which says: 
"No holder of any claim against any estate shall main-
tain any action thereon unless the claim is first pre-
sented to the administrator or executor (1, (1, (~," 
To this effect is the Oklahoma case of Fluke et. al vs. 
Douglas 13 P. ( 2d) 210. The ·court said: 
"The weight of the authority is, where the statutes 
require presentation of a claim against an estate to 
the personal representative, the petition or complaint 
in an action on such claim must allege presentation, 
and it has been held that this rule applies as well in 
suits in equity as in actions at law. 24 C. J. 843. 
The petition showing upon its face that the contract 
sued upon was made after the enactment of section 
12:34, supra, and failing to allege presentation of the 
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claim to the administrator, there was no basis for the 
finding or order relative to a deficiency judgment 
against the estate." 
The California Court in the case of Jacobson et. al. vs. 
Mead, et. al55 P. (2d) 285, says: 
"Furthermore, both counts of the plaintiffs' complaint 
are wholly insufficient to state a cause of action 
against the representatives of decedent's estate based 
upon an implied contract to return money after rescis-
sion, for the reason that neither of them alleges that 
a claim for the sum of $6,378, or any other sum, had 
been presented to or filed against the estate of Mead 
prior to the commenc~ment of the action. Probate 
Code, Sec. 707, and Cf).Ses collected under 11a Cal. 
Jur. 728. The complaint in so far as it was for a 
money judgment, is obviously deficient in an essential 
allegation which plaintiffs' cannot supply, and atten-
tion to which may be raised at any time." 
Also see Delfelder vs. Farmer's State Bank of River-
ton, et. al. 269 Pac. 418; Flynn et, al, vs. Driscoll, et. 
a1. 223 Pac. 524. 
THE LIEN OF THE JUDGMENT EXPIRED AND 
CEASED TO BE A LIEN ON THE 28TH DAY OF 
SEPTE~fBER, 1946. 
Under section 104-30-15, U. C. A. 1943, the life of a 
j,udgment: 
"shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is 
l?'reviously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the 
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judgment is stayed on appeal by the executiOn of a 
sufficient undertaking as provided by this code, in 
which case the lien of the judgment ceases." 
The limit of the duration of a lien is fixed at eight 
years. It may be shortened by being satisfied or by the 
execution of a sufficient undertaking on appeal. The 
editors in 49 C.J.S. at page 947, section 492, says: 
"In the absence of statutory authority the lien of the 
judgment ordinarily may not be extended beyond the 
period of time fixed by statutory regulations. In some 
jurisdictions the statutes specify the causes for which 
the life of the judgment lien shall be extended, and 
such statutes should be strictly construed and the lien 
ordinarly may not be extended except for the causes 
and in the manner prescribed by the statute. A sta-
tutory provision that execution may be had on real 
estate after the expiration of the statutory period for 
which the lien continues by filing a notice, subscribed 
by the sheriff, describio.g the judgment, the execution, 
and the property levied on, does not extend the origi-
nal lien of the judgment. 
Revival of judgment distinguished. The right to re-
vive a judgment is to be distinguished from the right 
to keep the lien of the judgment alive that the 
former is a right of action while the latter is not." 
This court in the case of Smith vs. Schwartz, 21 U. 
126, 60, Pac. 309, in speaking of the duration of a judgment 
lien, stated: 
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"The duration of judgment liens is dependent upon 
the express will of the legislature, and the courts have 
no power to extend them. Nor have they the right 
when the language employed by the legislature is un-
ambiguous, by con~truction, to make exceptions or 
qualifications to meet the hardship of particular cases. 
To do so would be a usurpation of legislative power. 
In the case at bar the execution under which said real 
estate was sold to Schwart was levied on said real 
estate more than five years after the abstract of the 
judgment rendered by the justice of the peace in 
favor of Schwartz was filed in the office of the clerk 
of the district court. At the latter date the judgment, 
by virtue of the statute, became a lien on the real 
estate and by virtue of the statute it expired five years 
from that date." 
Judgment liens are creatures of the statute. This 
Court in Thompson vs. Avery, 11 Utah, 214, stated: 
"Whatever right exists flows from the legislative de-
partment." 
Again, this court in Smith vs. Schwartz, 21 Utah 126, 
60 Pac. 309, with reference to the effect of the levy of an 
execution during the life of the judgment lien said: 
"It is well settled by the authorities that the levy of 
an execution upo:o real estate during the time that 
the judgment upon \\{lich the execution issued was 
a lien upon the sa:r:ne, neither extends the lien of the 
judgment, nor does it create a new lien upon the 
property. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
In line with the foregoing Utah decisions, in an ana-
logous situation the Courts also hold that the filing of a 
complaint to foreclose a lien in a court of equity does not 
extend the lien. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in the 
case of Gardenshire vs. King, et, al37 S. W. 54, said: 
"Failure to sell within that time is as fatal to this lien 
as if he had neglected altogether to take out his exe-
cution, nor is it extended beyond the statutory period 
because the creditor by an agreement with his debtor 
prevented himself from calling for an execution dur-
ing the whole or the greater part of that time. This 
is a misfortune which the law has made no provision 
for nor can he extend or perpetuate it by resorting to 
a bill in equity." 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of 
Newell v. Dart, et. al. 9 N. W. 732, said: 
"The plaintiff's right to the relief sought ·depends 
entirely upon the existence of his judgment. This 
action is wholly ancillary to the judgment and is in 
aid of the execution issued thereon for the purpose 
of reaching a certain chose in action of the judgment 
debtor and having it applied in satisfaction of the 
plaintiff's judgment. Hence, if plaintiff's judgment 
is dead, his case falls to the ground. It is provided 
by the statute •that a judgment shall survive and con-
tinue for a period of ten years and no longer.' Gen-
eral Statute 1878 C 66, Sec. 77. In the present case 
this period expired June 3, 1880, and during the pen-
tlency of this action. Hence, before the final trial and 
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decision of this case and before judgment rendered 
herein, plaintiff's judgment had ceased to exist either 
as a cause of action or a lien unless kept alive by the 
commencement and pendency of this action beyond 
the statutory period of ten years. 
We do not think the pendency of this action had any 
such effect <~~< ~ ~" 
In the case of Ruth vs. Wells, 83 N. W. 568, 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota held, the syllabus in 
the case is: 
"A judgment lien cannot be prolonged by a court of 
equity beyond the period fixed by the statute, though 
the suit is commenced and at issue within such period, 
but is not reached for trial until after the expiration 
thereof. Courts must apply statutes enacted within 
excepting any one from the operation therof, regard-
less of what they may think the legislature would have 
done if certain conditions had been considered; and 
when such statutes begin to run, judicial power can-
not arrest their action. 
The filing of a notice of action to enforce a judgment 
lien cannot, where the lien has expired before the 
action is tried, have any effect in extending the lien, 
nor entitle the judgment creditor to enforce it in any 
manner." 
To the same effect is King vs. Hayes, et, al. 9 S.W. 
(2d) 539; Rich vs. Cooper, 286 N.W. 383; Flag vs Flag, 
58 N.W. 109; Lupton vs. Edmonton et. al 16 S. W. (2d) 
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840; :McGinnis vs. Seibert et. al. 134 Pac. 396; I. Tager 
Co. et. al. vs. :Mixon et. al. 157 S. 80; First National Bank 
of ~1ontgomery vs. Powell, 155 So. 624. 
The lien of judgment is not a cause of aCtion. See the 
Georgia case of Tift et. al. vs. The Bank of Tipton et. al. 
4 S. E. ( 2d) 495, which states: 
"While, in a general sense perhaps, provisions after 
jud~ent, for the purpose of enforcing it, for pre-
serving its lien, rna y be considered as a continuance 
of an action already brought, they cannot be consi~­
ered as a bringing of an action ,o, ,o, ,o, 
The right to revive it is to be distinguished from the 
right to keep the line of the judgment in life. The 
former is a right of action, the latter is not." 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAIN-
TIFF'S DEMURRER TO THE AMENDED ANS-
WER AND CROSS COMPLAINT OF HARRY 
WALKER BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM. 
The defendant, Han;y Walker, in addition to setting 
forth in his amended answer that the plaintiff's money 
judgment had never been presented to the administrator 
of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, and that the 
lien had expired on the 28th day of September, 1946, set 
out that the plaintiff's judgrnent never attached as a lien 
on the property in question as it had at all times consti-
tuted the decedent's homestead. Furthermore, that it 
was distributed to the defendant under the provisions of 
102-8-2 U. C. A. 1943, by a decree of summary distribution, 
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and that it vested in him free and clear of plaintiff's pur-
ported judgment lien, and that in any event, the property 
vested in him as a probate homestead. -
The matters alleged in the amended answer were also 
realleged in the defendant's cross complaint, and they 
constituted the grounds for the relief prayed for. Thu;, 
the issues involoved in th~ ruling of the Court on the 
plaintiff's demurrers to the amended answer and cross 
complaint can be discussed together. Furthermore, in-
asmuch as the question regarding the jurisdiction of a 
court of equity to foreclose the plaintiff's purported lien, 
and the failure of the plaintiff to present its money judg-
ment to the administrator of the estate of the decedent, 
and the expiration of the lien, have heretofore been dis-
cussed, they will not be repeated 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS THE 
HOMESTEAD OF GERALD C. WALKER, DE-
CEASED, AND PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT 
NEVER ATTACHED AS A LIEN ON IT. 
This Court had before it 38-0-1, U. C. A. 1943, supra, 
which provides a homestead shall be exempt from a judg-
ment lien except for taxes accruing and levied, lawful 
mortgages and debts created for the purchase price there-
of. 
The decedent, Gerald C. Walker, at the date of his 
death, was a resident of Smithfield, Utah, the head of 
a family, and the property sought to be foreclosed by 
the plaintiff was of a value of less than $2000.00. 
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The foregoing_ statute specifically provides that a 
judgment does not attach as a lien to exempt property -
a homestead. This is also the holding of the Utah decision 
of Antelope Sheering Corale Company vs. Consolidated 
Wagon & :\1achine Company, et. al. 180 Pac. 596. 
As a collary to this where a judgment does not attach 
in the lifetime of a judgment debtor it does not attach 
upon his death. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the 
case of Garrison vs. Carl, 166 Pac. 152, said: 
«It follows that neither the lien of the grocer company 
nor of \Velton could attach to these lots while oc-
cupied and used by :Mrs. Wade as a homestead, and 
if they coul.d not then attach, neither can they attach 
when she dies. This for the reason given in that 
case where the homestead was sold - they no longer 
belong to the judgment debtor. It also follows that 
the judgments in question did not become liens upon 
the homestead in question, although filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court pursuant to Rev. 
laws 1910, Sec. 5148, and that the court erred in 
rendering the judgment complained of. It is un-
necessary to consider the remaining assignments o{ 
error." 
This is also the holding of the Texas case of McDaniel 
vs. ~Hiner, 19 S. W. ( 2d) 426. The Court said: 
"From the plain provisions of those articles of the 
Constitution and the provisions of Articles 3832, 3833 
and 3839, Rev. St. 1925, which are declaratory of 
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those constitutional provisions, it is manifest that the 
lien asserted by reason of the first judgment against 
G. W. McDaniel never attached to the property in 
controversy or any part thereof either before or after 
his death or the death of his wife." 
Thus the plaintiff in this case is in no better position 
than any other judgment creditor and in no event would 
he come within the provisions of 102-9-11, U. C. A. 1943. 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION VESTED IN THE 
DEFENDANT, HARRY WALKER, AS HIS HOME-
STEAD AND THUS IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
. PLAINTIFF'S PURPORTED JUDGMENT LIEN. 
The defendant, Harry Walker, at the date of the death 
of Gerald C. Walker, his father, was a minor of the age of 
nineteen years. It was distributed to him by summary 
distributions while still a minor and thus vested in him 
free and clear of the plaintiff's lien, if any. 
The court had before it 104-4-6, U. C. A. 1943, supra, 
which provides for the setting apart to the surviving hus-
band or wife and/or/minor children, a homestead to be 
wholly exempt from the payment of the debts of the de-
cedent, to be set apart on petition and notice at any time 
after the return of the inventory. 
Although it is true that the homestead was not set 
apart to him by the probate court as such, it nevertheless 
vested in him as a homestead as the value of the property 
is less than the amount of $2000.00, and where the value 
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of the property is less than the amount provided for as 
a homestead, the setting apart of it is unnecessary. The 
editors in :26 .-\m. Jur. page 56, section 89, says: 
--~ECESSITY FOR SELECTION AS AFFECTED 
BY A:\10UNT OF PROPERTY DEVOTED TO 
HO~IESTEAD USE -If the amount of the property 
which has been devoted to homestead use is less than 
that which, by virtue of the statute, may be subject 
to the right of homestead, no formal selection or 
designation is necessary, the assumption being that 
the claim of homestead will be asserted as to all of 
the property. This is true regardless of whether there 
is a provision in the statute prescribing the manner 
of selecting the property to be held as exempt. The 
n1le is the same where the widow or heirs claim the 
benefit of the exemption, no formal selection or sett-
apart being necessary if the property is of less value 
than the amount allowed by the statute." 
This is also the holding of the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota. In the case of Cullen vs. Sullivan, 177 N. W. 176, 
the Court said: 
"In this case the surviving wife was sole heir and also 
sole devisee under the will. In her case the decree 
setting off the homestead was largely in idle ceremony 
for the property w~ich was subject to the homestead 
estate belonged to her absolutely as the heir and 
devisee of her husband free and clear of any claims 
of the creditors of her husband." 
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To the same effect in the case of Green et. al. vs. Carr 
County State aBnk, 7 S. W. (2d) 620 (Texas.) The Court 
said: 
"It is asserted that there was no proper order setting 
apart the homestead for the use of the minor and that 
the probate proceedings being regular and in form 
vested the land in the appellee and the same may not 
be attached collaterally. The order setting apart the 
homestead for the use of minors operates merely upon 
possession of the land as between the heirs. The 
actual setting apart of the homestead in fact by the 
probate court is not essential to the vesting thereto 
in the heirs." 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY TO 
THE DEFENDANT, HARRY WALKER, IN SUM-
-.. l\fARY DISTRIBUTION UNDER 102-8-2, U. C. A., 
1943, VESTED THE PROPERTY IN HIM FREE 
AND CLEAR OF THE PLAINTIFF'S LIEN, IF 
ANY. 
The purpose of this statute was to grant a widow 
and/ or minor children, an allowance sufficient to protect 
them during the period immediately following the death 
of the husband and to place them in a position pending 
their social and economic adjustment where they would 
not become a charge on the public. This was done at the 
expense of the creditors, and a money judgment lien cre-
ditor should not be in any different position than other 
creditors established in view of the fact that his lien did 
not exist at common law and become one only by virtue 
of a statute. 
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Although this point wa\j1ot in issue i,{ljhe Utah case 
of In Re. :\1ower's Estate, 93 f. 390, 73 Pat/!J67, the Court 
said that 102-8-2 U. C. A. 1943 should be considered with 
101-4-6 U. C. A. 1943. The latter section provides for a 
probate homestead. 
It would appear that is was the intent of the legisla-
ture that property distributed under 102-8-2, U. C. A. 1943 
should be vested in the widow or minor children free and 
clear of all encumbrances, for it therein specifically pro-
vided: 
"The Court 1nay in its descretion exclude from the 
distribution of the property so set apart and distri-
buted, other than the homestead, any surviving wife, 
husband or minor children having separate income." 
I is u* thn 1 u: IS DCC f& hbYlt lj ll ii8 'iEii 
In view of the reasons set forth the appellants respect-
fully submit that the judgment of the Court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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